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Showing posts with the label China- Vietnam maritime dispute

How Will New Subs Affect Vietnam's South China Sea Strategy? ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Nam Nguyen)

A Kilo class submarine ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Ministry of Defence, Russian Federation) Source- The Diplomat Author- Nam Nguyen The fifth Kilo-class submarine procured for the Vietnamese People’s Navy (VPN) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay at the beginning of February. The Russian-built submarine started its journey from St Petersberg on the 16th of December on the Dutch-registered cargo ship Rolldock Star and arrived late in the night on Tuesday, February 2,  according to Thanh Nien News. There are currently four Vietnamese crews, supported by Russian advisers, for each of the existing Kilo-class Type 636 submarines in service with the VPN. Under Vietnam’s expanded relationship with Russia, a purpose-built submarine support facility was included as part of the deal to procure six conventional submarines for the VPN. With the end of this modernization cycle looming on the horizon, however, it remains to be seen how much of an impact these new platforms will ha

Vietnam’s Master Plan for the South China Sea ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Koh Swee Lean Collin)

Credits- Internet image Source- The Diplomat Author- Koh Swee Lean Collin For many years, Vietnam has been steadily accumulating new military capabilities to reinvigorate its antiquated Cold War arsenal, sourcing from mostly Russia but increasingly from other suppliers too. However, military effectiveness clearly does not depend on only kinetic capabilities; the means of detecting, tracking and guiding weapons against the intended targets constitute another essential element. Cognizant of this, besides continuing to acquire new kinetic capabilities Hanoi has undertaken nascent but nonetheless crucial steps in establishing a comprehensive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) suite. It is through this context that one may interpret recent revelation about the potential military significance of an Indo-Vietnamese deal to establish a satellite tracking station in Ho Chi Minh City, and an earlier report last year about Vietnam’s new unmanned aerial vehicle (

The Forces Awakening Against an Antagonistic China ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Richard Javad Heydarian)

Chinese PLAN ship ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States navy) Source- The National Interest Author- Richard Javad Heydarian Few can deny that China has had a particularly challenging year. In an effort to augment its sovereignty claims over what it considers as its national “blue soil,” China has inadvertently encouraged a growing number of nations to coalesce against it. One could argue that China has overplayed its hand, unleashing a dangerous strategic dynamic that threatens the whole region. Throughout the early years of this decade, China rapidly and inexorably altered the maritime status quo in East Asia, wresting control of Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal and deploying a giant oil rig into Vietnamese-claimed waters in the South China Sea. In possession of cutting-edge technology, and confidently overseeing decades of relentless military modernization as well as paramilitary mobilization, China has transformed a whole host of contested low-tid

Revealed: China's Forgotten Maritime Compromise ( Source- National Interest / Author- Issac B. Cardon)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / NASA) Source- The National Interest Author- Issac B. Cardon China has nine maritime neighbors (including Taiwan) but no settled maritime boundaries, due in part to Beijing’s unwillingness to specify its maritime claims. Only one partial exception to this imprecision exists: a boundary agreement with Vietnam to delimit the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin and a fishery agreement establishing a joint fishing regime in that area, both reached in 2000. The agreements offer both positive and negative lessons. At a minimum, they provide important precedents that should be more widely appreciated – foremost among them that it is possible for China to come to the bargaining table on maritime disputes. Meanwhile specific lessons can be applied to China’s bilateral maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam, and the Koreas. Unfortunately the Tonkin agreements support only modest expectations for resolution of the complex, multilateral Spratly Is