Skip to main content

Posts

Showing posts with the label Vietnam activities in South China Sea

How Vietnam Can Stop the South China Sea ADIZ ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Alexander Vuving)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / USN Source- The National Interest Author-  Alexander Vuving What is China’s next big move in the South China Sea? Ask the experts this question and tally their predictions. The action that will get the most votes is likely to be the imposition of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Indeed, a widespread view among the South China Sea watchers is that China will sooner or later declare an ADIZ in this semi-closed maritime domain, where it has reclaimed thousands of acres of land to build long airstrips, high-frequency radars, stationed combat aircraft and long-range missiles. This view is undergirded by two assumptions. The first is that Beijing is willing to accept high costs, while an ADIZ will bring enormous benefits to China. The second assumption is that there will be a moment when circumstances raise either the costs for China’s rivals to retaliate, the benefits for China to impose an ADIZ, or both. Consequently, declaring

Will Beijing's South China Sea 'Land Creation' Lose it the Peace? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- James Goldrick)

Image credits- VOA Source- The National Interest Author- James Goldrick China's leadership faces difficult decisions in the South China Sea. China is at some risk of achieving what it sees as a military success at the price of losing the peace. There is increasing evidence that its land creation (for they are not 'reclamation') activities in the South China Sea are developing a network of bases that will support fixed sensors, such as radars and underwater arrays, as well as the operations of air and seaborne surveillance units. The cumulative effect intended by Chinese planners appears to be to make it too dangerous during a conflict for other nations, most notably the US, to conduct significant military operations in the area, whether on, under or over the South China Sea; and certainly to make sure that none will go undetected in peacetime. China's goal is to be able to regard the sea areas south of Hainan Island as a safe haven for its naval f

South China Sea: 3 Ways to Win the Money War ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Eddie Linczer)

Image credits- Flickr/ United States Navy Source- The National Interest Author- Eddie Linczer China’s domination of the South China Sea is not yet a fait accompli, but the United States must implement a countercoercion strategy more urgently in order to maintain a favorable balance of power. Since the beginning of this year, China has deployed surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, as well as fighter aircraft, to Woody Island, a part of the Paracel Island chain in the South China Sea. These actions are stepping stones for China to dispatch missile batteries and jets to the more geopolitically significant Spratly Island chain. Now, there is growing concern that Beijing may declare an air-defense identification zone in the South China Sea. Left unchallenged, the Chinese are on track to create “mini denial zones” and bring greater coercive force to bear against neighboring Southeast Asian states. If current trends continue, the South China Sea will be a “Chinese lake” b

This Is How to Stop China from Dominating the South China Sea ( Source- The National Interest / Authors- Truong-Minh, VuNgo Di Lan)

Image credits- United States DOD Source- The National Interest Authors-  Truong-Minh , VuNgo Di Lan China’s growing assertiveness regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea is not the result of a burst of nationalism or any short-term calculation. In fact, China has consistently pursued a single long-term strategy with the effective control of the entire South China Sea as its ultimate goal. This strategy has five core features. First and foremost, it seeks to change the territorial status quo gradually, island-by-island. This stands in contrast to a strategy whereby a country tries to gobble up the entire disputed territory in one fell swoop. China first occupied the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then slowly expanded its presence southward by attacking Vietnam’s islands in the Spratly chain in the 1980s. Most recently, after a tense standoff with the Philippines, China took effective control of the Scarborough Shoal, thereby changing the territorial status qu

South China Sea- India's options

Image credits- Indian Navy South China Sea has been in news in recent times due to the aggressive activities of the Chinese which includes island buildings and aggressive petrols. South China sea is critical for the world commerce as it encompass major trade route connecting the far east with rest of Asia and Europe.  China's claim: China's obscure claim to the entire South China Sea relies on unreliable historic documents. China claims the entire of South China Sea in what they call the nine dash line. China has been in the past decade fortifying their claims with rapidly expanding the islands by incorporating construction and expansion. That put them in direct conflict with almost all off the other countries which has coastline with South China Sea including Vietnam and Philippines to name a few.  The threat to Indian security from an ever expanding China: China has been expanding it's reach into the Indian Ocean region which India considers to be i

How Will New Subs Affect Vietnam's South China Sea Strategy? ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Nam Nguyen)

A Kilo class submarine ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Ministry of Defence, Russian Federation) Source- The Diplomat Author- Nam Nguyen The fifth Kilo-class submarine procured for the Vietnamese People’s Navy (VPN) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay at the beginning of February. The Russian-built submarine started its journey from St Petersberg on the 16th of December on the Dutch-registered cargo ship Rolldock Star and arrived late in the night on Tuesday, February 2,  according to Thanh Nien News. There are currently four Vietnamese crews, supported by Russian advisers, for each of the existing Kilo-class Type 636 submarines in service with the VPN. Under Vietnam’s expanded relationship with Russia, a purpose-built submarine support facility was included as part of the deal to procure six conventional submarines for the VPN. With the end of this modernization cycle looming on the horizon, however, it remains to be seen how much of an impact these new platforms will ha

Vietnam’s Master Plan for the South China Sea ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Koh Swee Lean Collin)

Credits- Internet image Source- The Diplomat Author- Koh Swee Lean Collin For many years, Vietnam has been steadily accumulating new military capabilities to reinvigorate its antiquated Cold War arsenal, sourcing from mostly Russia but increasingly from other suppliers too. However, military effectiveness clearly does not depend on only kinetic capabilities; the means of detecting, tracking and guiding weapons against the intended targets constitute another essential element. Cognizant of this, besides continuing to acquire new kinetic capabilities Hanoi has undertaken nascent but nonetheless crucial steps in establishing a comprehensive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) suite. It is through this context that one may interpret recent revelation about the potential military significance of an Indo-Vietnamese deal to establish a satellite tracking station in Ho Chi Minh City, and an earlier report last year about Vietnam’s new unmanned aerial vehicle (

Revealed: China's Forgotten Maritime Compromise ( Source- National Interest / Author- Issac B. Cardon)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / NASA) Source- The National Interest Author- Issac B. Cardon China has nine maritime neighbors (including Taiwan) but no settled maritime boundaries, due in part to Beijing’s unwillingness to specify its maritime claims. Only one partial exception to this imprecision exists: a boundary agreement with Vietnam to delimit the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin and a fishery agreement establishing a joint fishing regime in that area, both reached in 2000. The agreements offer both positive and negative lessons. At a minimum, they provide important precedents that should be more widely appreciated – foremost among them that it is possible for China to come to the bargaining table on maritime disputes. Meanwhile specific lessons can be applied to China’s bilateral maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam, and the Koreas. Unfortunately the Tonkin agreements support only modest expectations for resolution of the complex, multilateral Spratly Is