Manoj Ambat's Blog dealing with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Strategic Affairs and Politics

USS Nimitz, CVN-69 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) Source- Eurasia Review Authors- Scott N. Romaniuk and Marinko Bobić US President Barack Obama recently (albeit allegedly) put an end to America’s foreign policy that had resisted external influence and interference in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine originally stated that efforts by foreign (European) states to colonize and become involved in states either in North or South America would ultimately be seen as aggressive acts. These conditions were articulated clearly and concisely by former president James Monroe in his seventh annual message delivered to Congress in December 1823. Monroe declared, “we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / White House official photos Source- The National Interest Author- Jeff M.Smith Since its historic rapprochement with Beijing in the 1970s, America has approached a rising China with an “engagement” strategy guided by two key assumptions: first, that political liberalization would ultimately follow economic growth; and second, that supporting China’s integration into the global order would preempt Beijing from forcibly challenging that order. While confidence in those assumptions has waxed and waned, never did a consensus emerge that they were fundamentally flawed—until now. Today, Washington is confronting the dreadful realization that with each passing year, the goals of political liberalization and peaceful integration appear to grow more distant, while the prospect for conflict with China draws nearer. Even advocates of engagement, like Dr. David Shambaugh, are warning that the strategy “is unraveling” while domestic repression in

Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- United States Department of State Source- Strategic Culture Foundation Author- Augusto Soto Washington's strategic pressure over Beijing assertiveness in the South China Sea, including measures such as US military reconnaissance activities and political and military coordination with China’s neighbours, adds additional threats in Asia Pacific in the broader context of bilateral ties discussed last week in Washington during the annual U.S.-China strategic and economic dialogue. Conflict risks Washington has bolstered its Asia Pacific monitoring systems, including closer political and military cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Australia. Beijing, meanwhile, declared by mid-June that it had concluded dredging enormous amounts of sand from around the Mischief Reef to build up land mass in South China Sea’s Spratly Islands during six months, according to the Pentagon. This in principle is the reason for

Image credits- China Daily Source- The Diplomat Author- Franz-Stefan Gady Yesterday, my colleague Ankit Panda provided a useful summary of the recently released annual U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on China’s military and security developments (see: “What the Pentagon Thinks of China’s Military”). In his article, Ankit notes that the paper contains an interesting discussion of China’s alleged “low-intensity coercion” (aka “salami slicing”) in the South and East China Sea, particularly the use of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), PLA ships, and its commercial fishing fleet to advance its own territorial claims. In detail, the paper states that Beijing “uses a progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed territories and avoid escalation to military conflict.” Additionally, next to an increased naval presence,China applies the following means to advance its territorial agenda in disputed areas, according to the

Chinese J-11 Fighter ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- United States Navy) Source- The National Interest Author- Harry J. Kazianis China’s military is growing in terms of raw power and basic power projection. Many of Beijing’s defense investments over the last two decades are aimed at limiting Washington’s ability to intervene in areas that China describes as being of “core interest.” But just how much should Washington worry about it? A good question, for sure. The answer, however, is as not as black and white as many might want it to be. And just how much should America prepare to duel with such anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces in the future? Let’s start with the obvious: While various A2/AD combat scenarios can paint a decidedly bleak picture for America and its allies in Asia in the event of a conflict with China, there are a number of reasons such a war will never come to pass in the first place. While large trade flows have not stopped conflict

Image credits- Xinhua News Agency Source- The National Interest Author- James Jay Carafano Between complacency and confrontation there is a responsible way forward that keeps the Asia-Pacific a big enough place to accommodate the vital interests of both Beijing and Washington. The heavy lifting will have to be done by the United States. That's okay. The work will make America a stronger nation and a better Asian ally. In the last decade, the Chinese regime has shown itself to be anti-democratic, no friend of free markets, a first-class cyber bully and more interested in rewriting or ignoring international norms than in respecting them. Left unchecked, the Beijing method of managing international relations is not likely to make the world a better or safer place. If America didn't share the same neighborhood with China, it might well ignore Beijing's behavior and let others deal with it. But China and the United States are stuck with each other. Unfo

Image credits-Wikimedia Commons/ White House  Source- The National Interest Author- Richard Javad Heydarian  Much to the delight of China, recent weeks have witnessed a dramatic reorientation in the Asian strategic landscape. Demonstrating sophisticated statecraft, Chinese president Xi Jinping astutely utilized the recently concluded Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to emphasize Beijing’s centrality to regional prosperity and stability. Xi rekindled communication channels with estranged neighbors such as Japan and Vietnam, exploring various mechanisms to de-escalate territorial tensions in the Western Pacific. The summit featured icy bilateral meetings between the Chinese leader (with a poker face) and his Japanese and Vietnamese counterparts, namely Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Truong Tan Sang. The meetings came on the heels of weeks of preparation by special envoys to facilitate a formal meeting between their respective heads of states. There w