Manoj Ambat's Blog dealing with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Strategic Affairs and Politics

Image credits- MEA Official gallery Source- The Diplomat Author- Rohan Joshi On December 3, 1971, while Indian and Pakistani forces were engaged in pitched land and air battles, then-U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger convened a meeting of the National Security Council’s Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG). “I’m getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India,” Kissinger is reputed to have said to the WSAG, “…he does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan.” By the ninth day of the war and with Indian troops barely 100 kilometers away from Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Enterprise sailed into the Bay of Bengal ostensibly on a rescue and relief mission for stranded U.S. citizens in East Pakistan. Although this did little to influence the eventual outcome of the 1971 India-Pakistan war — Pakistani forces surrendered to the Indian army

Image credits- MEA Official Gallery Source- The National Interest Author- Paul Pillar President Obama and his team scored an early success in the president's visit to India that didn't really require any effort on their part. The first 45 minutes of the president's meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi was devoted to discussing China, with the U.S. side pleased to find Modi sharing their own concerns about implications of China's rise for the strategic situation in the region. Not only were the U.S. and Indian assessments about China congruent; Modi took the initiative in suggesting revival of an informal security network that included the United States, India, Australia, and Japan. Modi's posture on this subject was much different from what has characterized India's overall strategic posture for most of its history since independence. Throughout the Cold War a major element of Indian diplomacy was what bore the label of neutralism, and

Image credits- Flickr / MEA Official gallery Source- The Diplomat Author- Harsh V. Pant Just a year back, the world’s largest and oldest democracies seemed on a collision course over the Khobragade affair. Today, thanks to deft diplomacy by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his team, Washington and Delhi stand on the cusp of a potentially transformative moment in their bilateral ties. When Modi visited the U.S. in September, his domestic critics wanted to discredit him by asking where the substance was. They argued that Modi’s visit was about style; that the optics overpowered the real issues that were bedeviling the relationship. When Modi invited Obama as the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations in Delhi, the critics came back arguing that there was little point to inviting Obama, who had become a lame-duck president with the defeat of the Democrats in November 2014 elections. But what Modi and Obama have been able to accomplish in the last two days underscor

Image credits- Flickr / MEA Official Source- The Diplomat Author- Ankit Panda After arriving in India over the weekend, U.S. President Barack Obama concluded a series of bilateral agreements with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Obama, who was invited to India as the chief guest for India’s annual Republic Day celebrations, broached the once-uncomfortable topic of climate change with Modi, making surprising progress on the issue. The two leaders followed up on themes addressed during Modi’s September 2014 trip to the United States and addressed some issues that had been on the U.S.-India bilateral back-burner for several years now. What follows below is a quick distillation of nine highlights out of the released joint statement, joint strategic vision document, and the visit overall. I’ll likely follow this up shortly with more detailed analysis on at least a couple of these points. I put together a similar summary of the previous U.S.-India bilateral joint statement

Image credits- Flickr / MEA Official Source- The Diplomat Author- Kabir Taneja On January 18, a Reuters reported claimed that Sri Lanka’s now former president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had expelled the station chief of India’s intelligence agency in Colombo after accusing him of working against his government and supporting the opposition. India denied the claim, but the report serves as an example of Rajapaksa’s thorny attitude towards New Delhi, irrespective of the face presented by public diplomacy. The docking last September of a Chinese naval submarine in Colombo turned heads in New Delhi, just as the new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi was still getting up to speed. The event underlined the magnitude of Chinese influence in Sri Lanka under Rajapaksa, despite assurances from Beijing that the docking was a routine stopover to re-stock on supplies before heading to the Gulf of Aden to participate in anti-piracy operations. A month later in October,

Indian troops under UN flag in Congo ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Attribution- Julien Harneis ) Source- The Diplomat Author- Pushan Das As the conflict in South Sudan crosses the one year mark, China is preparing its first deployment of combat troops in UN peacekeeping operations, reflecting the change in the country’s policy of non-interference based on principles set down by Premier Zhou Enlai at the 1955 Bangdung Peace Conference. But what exactly does this deployment of 700 combat troops to South Sudan mean – is it an example of China using its military to safeguard its commercial interests in the region? And does it also open up a new front in the country’s rivalry with India, which has been one of the major security providers operating under the UN flag on the African continent? With both countries becoming ever more dependent on African resources to drive their growing economies, India and China’s interests in peace and stability for trade are very high –

Image credits- Flickr / Indian MEA Source- The Eurasia Review Author- Santosh Sharma Poudel India signed a nuclear and defence deal with Russia during the President Putin’s recent visit to New Delhi. India also concluded agreements with Japan, the US and China in an important display of its traditional diplomacy undergoing nuanced change under Prime Minister Modi. By Santosh Sharma Poudel* Since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister, India’s foreign policy has gathered some pace. His visits to Australia, Japan and the United States brought the relationships with these countries to new heights with several economic and defence agreements. He had visited the three states proposed by a former Japanese prime minister to form an ‘arc of freedom’ democratic alliance. While the pacts with Australia were mostly socio-economic, the agreements with Japan and the US covered economic and security interests. Japan pledged economic assistance worth US$35 billion over five yea

Image credits- Flickr / Narendra Modi Official  © Source- The Eurasia Review Author- Neelam Deo The end of 2014 and the middle of Narendra Modi’s first year as prime minister is an opportunity to compare the style and substance of the foreign policies of his government with those of the previous dispensation. The contrast is most apparent in the energy and attention that has been invested in international relations, rather than in the direction. After all, while core national interests—such as border security and development—endure, the manner of pursuing them can indeed change. Modi’s articulation of his vision of the country has included new elements like the “Make in India” campaign; he has also brought a greater speed and intensity to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives such as attracting foreign direct investment to promote manufacturing in India. In pursuing the goal of industrialisation, Modi has shed some of the ideological elements of “third-worldism” an

Image credits- Flickr/ Narendra Modi Official  Source- The National Interest Author-  Danielle Rajendram The U.S.-India-Japan trilateral took place in New Delhi this past week, capping off a big year in foreign policy for India’s new government. With an eye on China, India has in recent years made a concerted effort to carve out a more serious role for itself in the Asia-Pacific. Under Modi, India has invested particular effort in strengthening ties with its East and Southeast Asian partners. Last week’s trilateral is a clear example of India’s growing role in the evolving strategic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific. Despite the preelection assumption that the BJP government would prioritize domestic reform, Prime Minister Modi has devoted an unexpected level of attention to foreign policy. Achieving an outright parliamentary majority, the 2014 elections delivered the BJP the largest electoral mandate of any Indian government since 1984. This parliamentary strength will gi