Manoj Ambat's Blog dealing with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Strategic Affairs and Politics

Image credits- Flickr/ MEA Official photo gallery, Government of India Source- Eurasia Review Author- Dr . Rajaram Panda North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong made a surprise two-day visit to India on 12-14 April 2015, the first by a foreign minister of that country in 25 years and thus a rare high-level engagement between India and North Korea. India and North Korea established diplomatic relations in December 1973. The timing and significance of the visit cannot be missed as Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to make a maiden three-nation visit to China, Mongolia and South Korea in May 2015. For India, this gave a good opportunity to reassess its stand on the on-going conflict between the South and North Koreas. As scheduled, Yong met with Sushma Swaraj and Vice-President Hamid Ansari. One cannot also miss the timing of the visit as India’s defence minister Manohar Parikkar left on a four-day visit to South Korea on 14 April even when Yong was still i

Credits- Internet Image Source- The Diplomat Author- Ankit Panda The question of “who’s number two” in Kim Jong-un’s regime in North Korea has been blurry  for some time, particularly since the dramatic late-2013 purge and execution of Kim’s uncle Jang Song-thaek. Since Jang’s demise, there have been several pretenders to that position. Now, it appears that one has formally risen above the rest. Hwang Pyong-so, widely believed to be the front-runner to be North Korea’s “number two,” confirmed his claim to that title this week when he was given membership in the politburo presidium of North Korea’s Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). This position, in addition to his status as the top political officer in North Korea’s military, makes him de facto second-in-command to Kim. Hwang’s ascent to the politburo presidium should end speculation on this topic. Hwang’s name was in the news last fall when, with Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Yang-gon in tow, he arrived in Incheon, South

Source- Wikimedia Commons / Author-Keith Luse Source- The Diplomat Author- Van Jackson If the global norm against nuclear proliferation is to retain meaning, North Korea must remain isolated from the international community in certain respects.  But that doesn’t mean the United States or South Korea should be allowed to conduct naïve policy and planning toward North Korea.  Recognizing the threat we are dealing with on the Korean Peninsula—a nuclear-armed North Korea—is a distinct proposition from allowing North Korea to rejoin the international community. In recent congressional testimony and in other forums, I variously described North Korea as a “virtual” and “de facto” nuclear state, as part of a larger argument about military planning.  Subsequently the chairman of South Korea’s Saenuri Party—whose members control the National Assembly and the Presidency—suggested it was time for South Korea to “recognize” (“in-jeong”) North Korea as a nuclear state.  This has se

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- J.A De Roo Source- The Diplomat Author- Ankit Panda The Washington Free Beacon reports that North Korea is making progress toward operationalizing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The report, by the Beacon‘s Bill Gertz, cites comments made by the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Cecil D. Haney, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee disclosed on Thursday. As The Diplomat covered last fall, North Korea’s SLBM development has been under the watchful eye of observers for some time now. A satellite imagery study by 38 North strongly hinted at an ongoing SLBM development process at North Korea’s Sinpo South Shipyard. Gertz’s report confirms that U.S. officials now believe that a North Korean SLBM is a safe assumption. A robust SLBM capability would be a major step for North Korea, particularly if it manages to successfully miniaturize a nuclear device for delivery from a submarine (a consider

North Korean KN-08 Missile ( Credits- Internet Image) Source- The Diplomat Author- 38 North / John Schilling This article was first published at  38 North , a blog of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. It is republished with kind permission. The past year might seem to have been one of conspicuous inactivity in North Korea’s long-range rocket program. The last flight test was the December 2012 launch of an Unha-3 carrying North Korea’s first successful satellite. Since then we have seen only the usual Scuds and Nodongs and possibly an improved variant of the short-range, solid-fueled KN-02 “Toksa.” The Musudan and KN-08 missiles so proudly displayed in July 2013 have not been seen since, and neither has been flight tested. In short, one might be tempted to conclude that the regime has given up its pursuit of long-range weapons. But conspicuous inactivity can mask quiet activity, visible mainly to the sort of people who spend their hours scrutinizing satel

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- David Monniaux Source- The Diplomat Author- Nah Liang Tuang On February 8, 2015, North Korea test fired five of what it termed “cutting edge” anti-ship missiles. Strategic political analysis would indicate that the date of the test firing holds more significance, as Pyongyang has chosen to showcase its latest naval armament upgrade a few weeks before annual U.S.-ROK military exercises, which the former regards as invasion rehearsals. While the missile testing was conducted to convey Pyongyang’s displeasure to Washington and Seoul, the successful testing of anti-ship missiles at a range of 200 km, as reported by South Korea’s defense ministry, is a development of note but not of alarm. No ‘Silver Bullet’ According to knowledgeable analysts, the DPRK’s latest weapon appears to be a Russian Kh-35 anti-ship missile, which the North Koreans christen the “KN-09” and claim as their own. Assuming that the KN-09 shares the same te

Kim Jong-Un ( Image credits Wikimedia Commons/ Author- Monico Chavez) Source- The Diplomat Author- Ankit Panda Recent reports based on comments by an anonymous South Korean official suggest that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un might have embarked on a new military purge. General Pyon In-son, the head of operations of the Korean People’s Army and a swift riser through KPA ranks, was reportedly “killed for expressing an opinion different to that of Kim,” according to Bloomberg. The incident will emphasize discipline — i.e. complying with Kim Jong-un’s vision — across the entire KPA establishment. Kim Jong-un, in general, is suspected to mistrust several senior KPA commanders, many of whom held senior positions during his father’s tenure as supreme leader. In November, Kim purged a senior National Defense Commission official, Ma Won-chun, for corrupt practices and a failure to follow orders. Purges have been an important part of Kim Jong-un’s lengthy power consolidation

Image credits- Shutter Stock/ Maxim Tupikov Source- The diplomat Author- Clint Richards North Korea is taking its typical approach to international condemnation, by both lashing out at the West (primarily the U.S.) and reaching out to whichever ally is most readily available (Russia in this instance). It is an old game that has relatively few surprises left, as ballistic missile tests have become old news, and even its nuclear program has had three tests without triggering any kind of military response. While it may seem that Pyongyang has boxed itself into a corner with very few options available, the regime’s ability to sustain itself in spite of near total isolation is its ultimate trump card, as nobody seems have to the ability or willingness to force North Korea’s leadership to face the accusations brought against it. This latest round of confrontation began on Tuesday with the passage of a UN draft resolution, which recommended that the International Criminal Co

Source- The Diplomat Author- Jongsoo Lee As Germany celebrated the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Western press paid attention to the process that culminated in this momentous but unexpected event on the night of November 9, 1989. Lessons from this German experience have policy implications for the other Iron Curtain that still stands today, dividing the Korean peninsula. Although many factors contributed to the collapse of the Wall, the following seems to be particularly instructive for the present Korean standoff: First is the fact that the fall of the Wall could not have taken place without far-reaching changes in the Soviet Union, the main sponsor of the East German regime and its security guarantor. A key aspect of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms was the Soviet leader’s policy of eschewing the use of force and respecting the popular will of the masses in the Soviet satellite countries. This respect for the fundamental human rights and free wil