Manoj Ambat's Blog dealing with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Strategic Affairs and Politics

USS Howard underway ( Source- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) S ource- The Diplomat Author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri The U.S. Navy was officially founded as the Continental Navy 240 years ago, on October 13, 1775, during the American Revolutionary War. Since its inception, the U.S. Navy has been involved in the Atlantic Ocean. Later on, its operations spread to the Pacific as the United States expanded. However, a topic that has interested me lately is the history of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean, which is not as well known as its exploits in the Atlantic or Pacific oceans. This is despite the recent heavy American military involvement in areas of the Middle East and South Asia near or on the Indian Ocean littoral. As noted by Robert Kaplan and many others, the Indian Ocean littoral is pivotal to the 21st century. This is but the re-emergence of a previous pattern that lasted until European colonialism, where the main corridor of world trade routes passed thr

Image credits- Chinese Media Source- National Interest Author- Joshua Kurlantzick After a decade, in the 2000s, in which China aggressively pursued warmer relations with many Southeast Asian nations, using a combination of diplomacy, aid, and soft power to woo its neighbors, the past five years have seen a significant chill in China-Southeast Asia relations. First, Beijing’s more aggressive pursuit of its claims in the South China Sea led to heightened tensions between China and other claimants—most notably Vietnam and the Philippines, but also increasingly Indonesia, where the armed forces are trying to rapidly modernize Jakarta’s naval capacity in part out of fear of China’s actions in the South China Sea. However, even as China alienated countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, it had until recently maintained relatively warm relations with several of the other leading Southeast Asian states, including Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia. These countries were either

Source- Wikimedia Commons Source- The Diplomat Author- Xie Tao In October 2011, Foreign Policy magazine published an article by then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. Titled “America’s Pacific Century,” the subheading of the article reads: “The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.” This article is widely viewed as the manifesto of the Obama administration’s Asia policy — originally stated as the “pivot to Asia” but subsequently rephrased as the “rebalance to Asia.” For most Chinese officials and analysts, this rebalance to Asia is a thinly-disguised U.S. attempt to “encircle” a rising China. Indeed, considering the chain of U.S. military deployments and defense alliances in the Western Pacific, it is impossible for Washington to refute such an interpretation of its rebalance. So how did Beijing respond? Some Chinese analysts propose that China should instead

Chinese Chengdu J-10 combat plane ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons /  天剣2 Source- National Interest Author- Alice Slevison While China’s unilateral declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over disputed waters in the East China Sea (ECS) caught many by surprise, today’s debate circles around the likelihood that Beijing might take the same action over the South China Sea (SCS). In its pursuit of maritime primacy in Northeast Asia, China has strayed far from the international norms that dictate the implementation and use of an ADIZ. An ADIZ is airspace beyond a country’s sovereign territory within which the state requires the identification, location and air traffic control of aircraft in the interest of national security. The mechanism is a legacy of the Cold War, having first been declared by the U.S. in 1950; Over 20 states now administer their own ADIZ. According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, when entering the zone, such as the o

Russian S-400 Triumf Air defence missile ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Соколрус) Source- Russia & India Report On the eve of Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s first visit to Israel, one of India’s leading weapons suppliers, India is planning to buy the new-generation Russian S-400 ‘Triumf’ air defence missile systems, which can destroy incoming hostile aircraft, stealth fighters, missiles and drones at ranges of up to 400-km, Indian media reports in the ‘Times of India’ and the ‘Economic Times’ said on Sunday. Sources told the Times of India that the defence acquisitions council (DAC), chaired by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, will "soon" take up the proposal moved by the Indian Air Force (IAF) to purchase around a dozen S-400 long-range systems from Russia. "The project is at an initial stage at present. But it will be a government-to-government contract when it is finalized, with the S-400 systems being inducted over several years,&qu

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy Source- The Diplomat Author- Franz Stefan-Gady An announcement will be made shortly  re-designating what had hitherto been officially an Indian-U.S. bilateral military exercise into a trilateral India-U.S.-Japan event, according to the Business Standard. And while Japan’s participation is not new—the JMSF have joined in 2007, 2009, and 2014 respectively—it will be the first time that the Japanese Navy will not be a foreign invitee but rather a permanent member of the annual trilateral naval drill. The Malabar exercises initially began as a joint Indo-U.S. naval drill in 1992. After a suspension from 1998 to 2002, due to India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998, the exercise has been held every year since then under the watchful eye of China. Previous participants include Singapore and Australia. Back in 2007, China went on the diplomatic offensive after the annual Malabar exercise had been dubbed a “concert of

Bowing B-52 Stratofortress ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Author- United States Air force) Source- National Interest Author- James Hasik In The Australian last November, David Kilcullen argued that “the West’s failed counter-terrorism strategy requires a complete rethink.” Set aside for the moment James Fallows’ screed in The Atlantic last December. Thirteen years of not-quite-winning two wars in the Middle East and South Asia, despite overwhelming material advantage, is not a good track record for national strategy. At this point, the air campaign against ISIS may be holding the line, but it is not rolling anyone back, and cannot do so alone. Frankly, as I argued here more narrowly a few days after Kilcullen (see “Software is Eating the War,” 3 November 2014), the West's whole defense-industrial strategy could use a thorough rethinking too. Ominously, though, shifting economic and technological trends are rendering questionable its hitherto highly successful mas

Image credits- Talk Vietnam Source- The Diplomat Author- Koh Swee Lean Collin The visit by Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam, to Japan last month marked yet another milestone in an increasingly close strategic partnership. On this occasion, Japan and Vietnam issued a Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Relations as well as a Memorandum on Cooperation between Coast Guard Agencies. Tokyo also inked an agreement to furnish Hanoi with a 200 billion yen ($1.66 billion) non-refundable aid grant for the latter’s maritime safety in fiscal 2015, while promising to provide additional used patrol vessels to enhance Vietnam’s civilian maritime law enforcement (CMLE) capacity. What is interesting is that the visit came fewer than three months after Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung met his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe in Tokyo, where he reiterated Hanoi’s desire to ramp up the bilateral maritime security relationship, inclu

Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- Alex Beltyukov Source- The National Interest Author- Michail Barabanov Russia's intervention in Syria is the most remarkable military and political campaign of Putin's era, the first post-Soviet substantial military foray beyond the borders of the former USSR. For historical purposes, Russia's intervention in Syria, more than anything else, marks its return to the global arena as a player with whom other powers--led as they are by the United States--must contend, albeit reluctantly. Clearly, the decision to dispatch a Russian military contingent to Syria was a very risky step in military, foreign policy, and domestic policy terms. The military intent whereby the operation would be limited solely to aerial bombardment and support of an ally fighting on the ground appears reasonable and moderate; however, one might recall that, in the early days in Vietnam, the Americans pursued a similar course, and look how things