Manoj Ambat's Blog dealing with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Strategic Affairs and Politics

USAF F-35 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / USAF) Source- The National Interest Author- Robert Farley The focus of ground combat operations has shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Relatively few operations now involve the defeat of a technologically and doctrinally similar force, leading to the conquest or liberation of territory. Preparation for these operations remains important, but ground combat branches also have a host of other priorities, some (including counter-insurgency and policing) harkening back to the origins of the modern military organization. What will the balance of ground combat power look like in 2030, presumably after the Wars on Terror and the Wars of Russian Reconsolidation (more to come on this idea below) shake out? Predictions are hard, especially about the future, but a few relatively simple questions can help illuminate our analysis. In particular, three questions motivate this study: • Does the army have access

Sukhoi PAK FA ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Rulexip) Source- The National Interest Author- Robert Farley The PAK FA has played the bugbear for Western air forces for nearly a decade, the terrifying Russian jet that will eat F-35s for breakfast. American aviation analysts in search of something, anything that might threaten U.S. air dominance settled on the PAK FA, a frankly evil looking jet that bore a very mild resemblance to the MiG-31 “Firefox” that Clint Eastwood made famous. Say what you will about the F-35, but Lockheed Martin has actually built and delivered one hundred and seventy one aircraft thus far.  The Russian Air Force, meanwhile, has yet to receive its first PAK FA.  In lieu of the PAK FA, Russia has continued to acquire generation 4.5 fighters (mostly of the Flanker family) as well as upgrading generation 4 fighters (including various Flankers, the MiG-29 Fulcrum, and the MiG-31 Foxhound). Sukhoi will likely never build the number of fighters

PLA soldiers( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Chairman, Joint  Chiefs of Staff, United States) Source- The National Interest Author- Julian Ku The Philippines’ sweeping victory in this week’s arbitral decision issued under the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea dealt a serious blow to China. But while the arbitral award dramatically changed the legal landscape and geography of the South China Sea in favor of the Philippines and the United States, it is important to keep in mind that even following the award’s legal conclusions, China may have the legal right to maintain a strong and even dominant presence in the Spratly Islands.  To be sure, the arbitral award is a big defeat for China’s legal claims in the region. Prior to the decision, China had a series of ambiguous but legally plausible claims to historic rights under its famous “9 Dash Line” as well as an unspecified series of exclusive economic zones covering all of the Spratly Islands.  Such unspecified c

KPV heavy machine gun ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / George Shuklin) Source- Russia & India Report Author- Rakesh Krishnan Simha India’s resurgent defence industry manufactures a bunch of high profile weapons platforms under licence from Russia. These include the Sukhoi-30 MKI air dominance fighter, the T-90 “Flying Tank” and stealthy Krivak III (Talwar) class frigates. These high-profile weapons provide the Indian armed forces a decisive edge. At the same time, there are several Russian weapons that are critical elements of India’s war fighting strategy. Some of these platforms have been produced in the thousands but rarely merit a mention. PK machine gun The PK (Pulemyot Kalashnikova or "Kalashnikov's Machinegun") is a 7.62 mm light vehicle-mounted machine gun used by India’s frontline infantry. As well as a general purpose machine gun, the PK is used as a co-axial weapon on India’s Russian origin platforms like the T-90 and T-72 tan

USS Carl Winson ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) Source- The National Interest Author- Derek Lundy With China set to reject the upcoming ruling on the South China Sea by the UN's Permanent Court of Arbitration, what’s the next step to containing the simmering dispute?  President John Kennedy’s 'flexible response' strategy might provide an answer. In early 1961, Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara realized that the US’ massive nuclear arsenal could help prevent major war with the Soviet Union, but could not be relied on for emerging challenges; lower-level conflict and intimidation in the peripheries of the Cold War. They knew they needed a wider range of military, diplomatic, political and economic options readily on hand so that US measures could be appropriately calibrated to address these new concerns. As Kennedy put it to Congress that year, the US posture "must be sufficiently flexible and under con